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PERSPECTIVES 
A Psychological Model of Mental Disorder 
Peter Kinderman, PhD 
A coherent conceptualization of the role of psychological factors is of great importance in 
understanding mental disorder. Academic articles and professional reports alluding to 
psychological models of the etiology of mental disorder are becoming increasingly common, 
and there is evidence of a marked policy shift toward the provision of psychological therapies 
and interventions. This article discusses the relationship between biological, social, and 
psychological factors in the causation and treatment of mental disorder. It argues that simple 
biological reductionism is not scientifically justified, and also that the specific role of 
psychological processes within the biopsychosocial model requires further elaboration. The 
biopsychosocial model is usually interpreted as implying that biological, psychological, and 
social factors are coequal partners in the etiology of mental disorder. The psychological 
model of mental disorder presented here suggests that disruption or dysfunction in 
psychological processes is a final common pathway in the development of mental disorder. 
These processes include, but are not limited to, cognitive processes. The model proposes that 
biological and social factors, together with a person’s individual experiences, lead to mental 
disorder through their conjoint effects on those psychological processes. Implications for 
research, interventions, and policy are discussed. (HARV REV PSYCHIATRY 2005;13:206–217.) 
Keywords: biological reductionism, biopsychosocial model, psychological processes 
 
The past few years have seen a massive investment in 
research and development in the field of mental disorder. 
It is estimated that in the United Kingdom, the National 
Health Service spends about £219 million per year on 
mental health research,1 and mental disorder has been 
estimated to cost the state £77 billion annually.2 
In July 1989, President George Bush designated the 
1990s as the “Decade of the Brain.” The European 
Community Council of Ministers3 swiftly followed suit. 
More recently, advances in imaging techniques—such as 
computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging, and 
positron emission tomography—have been hailed as 
offering great potential for detailed neuroanatomical 
investigations of many disorders.4  
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Nevertheless, although such research into biological 
aspects of mental disorder is both welcome and 
productive, it is important that the research be properly 
integrated with psychological and social accounts of the 
phenomena in question. Some observers fear the 
retrenchment of a reductionist, biomedical approach to 
mental disorder,5 and it has been argued that diagnostic 
and etiological accounts stemming from a simple 
biomedical approach will be partial and scientifically 
inadequate.6  Ill-informed reductionist accounts may also 
create the unfortunate perception that mental health care, 
so understood, is both dehumanizing and lacking in 
humanistic sensibilities.7 
Psychological approaches to mental disorder offer 
alternative perspectives and can also be integrated with 
biological perspectives. This article will suggest that a 
comprehensive psychological model of mental disorder 
can offer a coherent, theoretically powerful alternative to 
reductionist biological accounts while also incorporating 
the results of biological research. 
Most biomedical theories of, and biomedical 
interventions into, mental disorder explicitly or implicitly 
relate to synaptic or intracellular processes.8 Such 
theoretical models implicate abnormalities in 
neurotransmitter functioning, and drug treatments (e.g., 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) target synaptic 
neurotransmitters. By contrast, psychological approaches 
focus on associative networks based in the neural 
substrate but developed through learning, and rely on 
theories of conditioning, perception, appraisal, and belief 
formation, on propositional and implicational encoding, 
on mental models of the world and internalized schemas 
of relationships, and so forth. Psychological models of 
mental disorder therefore address different sorts of 
mechanisms than exclusively biomedical theories, but 
also strive to encompass more than the mere mechanics 
of any individual system and to look at interactions and 
interrelationships. 
Over the past few years, reports by professional 
bodies, strategy documents from policymakers, and 
proposed changes in legislation have all stressed the role 
of psychologists and of psychological perspectives in 
mental health. As an example, the first national clinical 
guidance issued by the United Kingdom’s National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence concerned the frontline 
treatment of schizophrenia.9 Among other important 
comments, this document recommended that “100%” of 
those diagnosed with schizophrenia be offered cognitive-
behavioral therapy. Recent academic reviews of the role 
of psychosocial influences on mental illnesses and 
psychotic experiences,10 as well as major grant-funded 
randomized controlled trials, have repeatedly 
demonstrated the effectiveness of psychological 
therapeutic approaches in a range of mental health 
problems.11−13 
Psychological formulation—the summation and 
integration of the knowledge that is acquired through the 
assessment process14—represents an attempt to explain 
why people are experiencing difficulties. Formulations 
usually consist of a list of problems and possible 
psychological reasons for these;15 they typically examine 
events in an individual’s life and how he or she has 
interpreted and reacted to these; they are hypotheses 
about the nature and origin of problems, which are tested 
out over time16 and therefore tend to change over the 
course of both assessment and therapy; and they are 
complex and may comprise a number of provisional 
hypotheses based on a large variety of psychological 
theories, each drawing on scientific research. Many 
psychologists use formulations, as do many 
psychiatrists—either as an adjunct to diagnosis (the 
iconic DSM-IV17 suggests that diagnosis is only a start) 
or, as some psychiatrists propose, an alternative to 
diagnosis.18 But what, then, makes for a good 
formulation, one that properly incorporates psychological 
elements? And this question raises, in turn, an even more 
fundamental one: what are the psychological elements of, 
and how does one construct, a coherent psychological 
model of mental disorder? 
In this context it is worth mentioning the 
biopsychosocial model that George Engel7 developed as a 
means of providing a scientific account of mental 
disorder that could challenge a reductionist biological 
account. The biopsychosocial model conceptualizes 
mental disorder as emerging from a human system that 
has both physical elements (a biological nervous system) 
and psychosocial elements (relationships, family, 
community, and the wider society).19,20 This model was 
widely adopted,21−23 but the inevitable microhistorical 
pressures, such as the response of mainstream psychiatry 
to so-called antipsychiatrists,24−26 has meant that some of 
the gloss has worn off the biopsychosocial model. 
Antipsychiatry remains vocal,18,27,28 while, conversely, 
biodeterminist writings are also common,8 with Wing29 
being an especially influential advocate. 
The emphasis within the biopsychosocial model on 
social and psychological perspectives, and not 
exclusively on the biological aspects of mental disorder, 
may be welcome, but consideration needs to be given to 
how, in each case, the elements—bio-, psycho-, and -
social—relate one to another. The biopsychosocial model 
is, or should be, more than a simple statement that these 
three aspects should be included in a formulation, In 
practice, the model has been interpreted as reserving a 
dominant position for biomedical approaches5—with 
social and psychological factors being acknowledged but 
nevertheless considered to be mere moderators of the 
direct causal role of biological processes. This “primacy” 
of biomedical causation30 has been cited, in turn, as an 
argument for the professional superiority of one 
profession (specifically, medical psychiatry) over others31 
— a claim that has become, needless to say, a source of 
some tension.32 
This article argues that the role of psychological and 
social processes in mental disorder requires further 
attention. The biopsychosocial model does not address 
the issues of the nature of the interrelationships between 
elements. Importantly, it fails to address issues related to 
the different status and nature of the different elements—
the unresolved issue of “primacy.” The nature of 
psychological factors itself needs further attention—
including a consideration of the different functions that 
psychological factors can play in different models of 
mental disorder: as causes, symptoms, and possible 
therapeutic factors. 
Such consideration may, paradoxically, rationalize 
and contextualize the role of biochemical aspects in the 
biopsychosocial model. That model fails properly to 
address biological accounts of mental disorder if it 
cannot explain, for example, how monoamine 
abnormalities in depression33 relate to findings of low 
self-esteem34 and negative thinking patterns35,36 and to 
findings of greatly increased incidence of mental disorder 
in disadvantaged groups.37 A coherent model of the links 
between these findings—which would emerge from a 
coherent psychological model of mental disorder—
should also ensure that biological approaches to mental 
disorder are given proper regard. 
What, then, is a psychological conceptualization of 
mental disorder? Is there a coherent, simple model of 
mental health that simultaneously elucidates the 
psychological perspective and contrasts it with that of 
other approaches? What would a generic psychological 
model of mental disorder look like? Could a coherent 
account of the role of psychological factors in mental 
disorder also help the development of an integrative 
model of mental disorder, one in which multiple causal 
factors, different symptomatic markers, and different 
therapeutic elements are all appropriately addressed? 
 
MULTIPLE CAUSES OF MENTAL 
DISORDER 
 
The biopsychosocial model is based on the notion of 
multiple simultaneous causes of mental disorder. Clinical 
and research evidence supports this assumption (as will 
be discussed below), which any proposed generic 
psychological model must take into account. One can 
imagine something along the lines of a theoretical 
multiple regression equation, with mental ill health as the 
dependent (predicted) variable. One might even imagine 
measuring such disorder on a numeric scale ranging from 
0 to 100, or perfect mental health. One can further 
imagine three possible independent or predictor 
variables. The biopsychosocial model, as well as the 
model proposed here, includes multitude causes— 
multitude predictors. For the purposes of the argument 
presented here, however, three main classes of predictor 
variables (biological, social, and circumstantial) are 
included, as illustrated in Figure 1. It is worth noting that 
these classes of causal or predictor variables are slightly 
different from the components of the biopsychosocial 
model—reflecting, as will be clarified below, two 
important modifications of that model: the distinction 
between psychological processes and personally 
significant life events—or what I shall refer to as 
“circumstances”—and the specific status given to the 
disruption of psychological processes as a “final common 
pathway” to mental disorder, meaning that it is only 
through the disruption of psychological processes that 
any precursors, whether biological, social, or 
circumstantial, come to be expressed and experienced as 
mental disorder. 
All of these classes of variables are causally related to 
mental ill health. Links between mental disorder and 
genetics, biochemical abnormalities, neuroanatomical 
abnormalities, and the structure and functioning of the 
brain have been studied extensively. Some authors have 
even argued that in contrast to biological variables, 
which have obvious explanatory power in cases of 
mental disorder, psychosocial aspects account only for 
human experiences that fall short of being classified as 
clinically significant disorders.30 In any event, a variety of 
problems—from unipolar depression38 to bipolar 
disorder39 to schizophrenia40—has been reliably 
associated with genetic heritability. Consequently, in the 
hypothetical multiple regression equation suggested 
above, it is likely that an imaginary predictor variable 
capturing the population’s biomedical variance would be 
a significant predictor of variance in mental ill health. 
Equally, we have evidence that social factors 
contribute to mental disorder. Again, the number of 
studies is enormous, but there are clear links between 
poor housing41 and poverty and unemployment,42 on the 
one hand, and the expression of a wide range of mental 
health problems, on the other; put more simply, there is 
an association between mental disorder and the 
experience of poverty and deprivation.43−45 In our 
hypothetical example of a multiple regression equation, a 
general measure of disadvantageous social environment 
would clearly be a significant predictor of variance in 
mental ill health. This type of social causal variable can 
be seen as occupying the space of psychiatric 
sociology—examining and contextualizing social causes 
of mental disorder.46 
When people refer to psychological issues, they 
sometimes refer to the effects of potentially life-shaping 
experiences, or circumstances, that affect mental 
health— childhood sexual abuse,47 bullying,48 attachment 
relations with parents,49 assault,50 and all other major and 
minor interpersonal experiences. Although these 
circumstances are of disparate kinds, they and many 
other life events contribute to mental disorder.51,52 
Because of the breadth of these circumstances, it may be 
difficult to capture them all on one hypothetical 
dimension. Nevertheless, in our hypothetical multiple 
regression equation, it is likely that an imaginary 
predictor variable capturing these potentially damaging 
cumulative life events would also be a significant 
predictor of variance in mental disorder. This variable 
represents one important meaning of the term 
“psychological” as it is used in this context—as a 
reference to the causal role of “psychosocial” factors in 
the development of mental disorders. Another use of the 
term “psychological” is to refer to interpretation or to 
information processing—the process by which personal 
meaning is ascribed to the events. Psychologists thus 
routinely distinguish between life events or 
circumstances and the personal meaning that these events 
have for an individual,16 whereas the original 
biopsychosocial model tends to obscure this distinction. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Contributory factors in mental disorder. 
 
A simple statement that biological factors, social 
factors, and life circumstances all contribute to the 
development of mental disorder does not take us further 
than the biopsychosocial model. It is important to 
separate potentially salient life circumstances from both 
the broader social context and from the psychological 
interpretative processes. The relative contributions of the 
various hypothetical contributors to mental ill health and 
their relationship to one another must also be clarified, 
reflecting the specific psychological nature of the model 
proposed here. 
First, scholars and scientists from different academic 
and professional backgrounds may well differ as to their 
hypotheses about the relative importance of the putative 
predictor variables. Witness the current interest in 
genetics. As commented above, genetic aspects of mental 
disorder are important. The facts are frequently 
overstated, however, and the concept of heritability itself 
can be misleading when applied to psychological 
phenomena. For example, the heritability of psychotic 
disorders has been quoted as being as high as .85.53 This 
figure is commonly taken to imply that 85% of the 
variance in the presentation of psychotic symptoms can 
be statistically attributed to the variance in the 
population’s genome. This interpretation may be 
misleading, however. Rutter54 cogently argues that 
psychosocial, circumstantial, and developmental 
influences on mental disorder are significant. He points 
out that some of the assumptions behind molecular 
genetics research do not translate easily into lay language 
(for example, genetic effects plus the above 
environmental effects do not necessarily sum to 100%), 
which Rutter argues may lead to subtle, but important, 
misrepresentations of biological findings when discussed 
in contexts such as the present discussion. It is not 
necessarily correct, for instance, to suggest that social 
background, life circumstances, and psychological 
factors together could explain only the “remaining” 15% 
of the variance in the presentation of psychotic 
symptoms. 
In addition to their separate roles in accounting for 
variance, biological, social, circumstantial, and 
psychological variables interact. Psychological 
vulnerability factors such as neuroticism55 may make a 
person more emotionally responsive to life events. 
Similarly, the social support buffer hypothesis56 suggests 
that the level of a person’s available social support 
buffers the impact of circumstantial stressors on mental 
health. Thus, for two individuals experiencing stressful 
events, the person with the greatest level of social 
support will experience a lower level of mental disorder. 
A similar set of interactions may explain why the 
concordance rate for monozygotic twins for no mental 
disorder is 100%.57 Consequently, it is not inevitable that 
biomedical models would dominate other explanations 
for mental disorder. Social factors and the influence of 
circumstantial life events may be just as important. 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF BIOLOGICAL ABNORMALITIES 
 
Giving proper weight to the role of biological factors 
in mental disorder in no way undermines the 
psychological model proposed here; what is required, 
however, is that biological variables be placed into a 
proper relationship with other factors. In the case of 
auditory hallucinations, for example, a fascinating story 
is emerging. Biologically, there is considerable evidence 
of a genetic element in schizophrenia.40 Schizophrenia, 
psychotic symptoms, and hallucinations have been linked 
with cerebral lateralization.58 In particular, it has been 
suggested that people who hear voices are more likely to 
have poorly lateralized cerebral hemispheres, and that the 
brain’s language areas are less lateralized in people who 
hear voices.59 It is entirely credible, moreover, that 
biochemical, neuroanatomical, or genetic abnormalities 
lead to poor lateralization of language processing and 
hence to the problems associated with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia.60 Since one key task in neural language 
processing is presumably the identification and 
localization of perceptual experiences, this failure of 
lateralization seems to lead to problems in discriminating 
voices (heard) from other forms of cognition (thought or 
remembered). Psychologically, what we have in such 
cases is a failure or disruption of a psychological 
process—source monitoring or attribution, or reality 
monitoring.61 
It would be incorrect to infer that biological factors 
can therefore be excluded, or even minimized, in the 
development of hallucinations. Nevertheless, few people 
would dispute that auditory hallucinations are 
psychological phenomena, and what the preceding 
analysis suggests is that hearing voices must be 
conceptualized as a psychological phenomenon not only 
in terms of result, but also in terms of process. The final, 
inescapable pathway to hearing disembodied voices is 
the misattribution of the source of percepts—a 
psychological process. It is influenced by biological 
factors, but it is equally influenced by social 
environmental factors and the important circumstances in 
a person’s learning history. 
The point of the above example is not to present 
findings concerning cerebral asymmetry in 
hallucinations, but to illustrate that a plausible biological 
pathway from genetics, through neurology, to behavior 
necessarily implicates psychological processes. That is, 
biological factors influence mental disorder through their 
impact on psychological processes. The case of 
depression is illustrative. Abnormalities in serotonin 
metabolism are implicated in depression;62 for example, a 
tryptophan-reducing (and therefore serotonin-reducing) 
diet can induce depression.63 In the psychological model 
of mental disorder proposed here, this association is 
accepted, but the causal role of biology is seen as being 
effected through the disruption of psychological 
processes. A reduction in dietary tryptophan leads to a 
reduction in available cerebral serotonin, which is 
implicated, in turn, in the neurological mechanisms 
supporting various important appraisal processes. It is 
entirely plausible to suggest that these appraisals will 
include the ways in which people see themselves, their 
world, and their future—the negative cognitive triad of 
the cognitive model of depression.35 Thus the biological 
tryptophan-serotonin system could indeed lead to 
depression, but through psychological processes. 
Likewise, insofar as social factors have a central role 
in the emergence of mental disorder, it is only through 
the disruption of psychological processes. A 
psychological model of mental disorder (based on the 
disturbance or disruption of psychological processes) 
accepts that living in poverty and in conditions of social 
deprivation can indeed lead to problems such as 
depression. In particular, living in such a disadvantaged 
environment may lead to disillusionment, hopelessness, 
and learned helplessness—to a realization that there is 
little or nothing that one can do to improve or change 
one’s lot in life, and perhaps even that one’s actions have 
no effect or purpose.64−66 Depression is then the direct 
consequence of this disruption of psychological 
processes. 
And, finally, the same applies to particular life 
experiences, or circumstances. Being assaulted by one’s 
parents obviously leads to problems (frequently, again, 
depression). But psychologists would argue that the 
association between cause (assault) and the effect 
(mental disorder) is, again, mediated by the disruption or 
malformation of psychological processes. In the case of 
sexual, emotional, or physical abuse, the experience is 
likely to affect the ways in which the children (and later 
the adults) appraise themselves, the people in their lives, 
their own actions and the consequences thereof, and the 
ways in which relationships and social intercourse should 
be governed—that is, their cognitive schemas.67 Indeed, 
there is convincing evidence68 that assaults that mirror 
childhood events reactivate such cognitive schemas with 
terrible consequences. 
It is important to stress that these psychological 
processes are not just cognitive. Cognitive processes are 
important (and in vogue), and the impact of writers such 
as Beck,35 Seligman,69 and Young67 is undeniable. 
Nevertheless, other psychologists and psychiatrists have 
stressed disruptions or disturbances in psychological 
processes other than cognitive ones. The phenomenon of 
“learned helplessness” was mentioned earlier and is 
closely associated with Seligman’s cognitive approach,69 
but learned helplessness itself was initially analyzed as a 
behavioral phenomenon.70 Purely behavioral models of 
depression have a distinguished 
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history71 and remain highly regarded,72 and behavioral 
elements are a key part of conventional cognitive-
behavioral therapy. 
Psychodynamic approaches—which, within the 
model presented here, invoke the disruption or 
disturbance of object relations, sexual drives, or other 
intrapsychic events under the category of “psychological 
processes”—similarly have a distinguished history, have 
been massively influential on modern psychology, and 
are currently a core part of the practice and ethos of 
clinical psychology.73 In the example of depressed mood 
used here, the psychodynamic notions of depression as 
involving, for instance, disrupted object relations74 or 
involuted anger75 remain respectable elements of 
psychological formulations. In the case of personality 
disorders, although most recent psychological accounts 
of personality problems cite maladaptive cognitive 
schemata concerning social relationships,68,76 other 
writers have cited either failures to integrate personality 
structure77 or disruptions of psychodynamic processes 
related to fundamental object relations.78 In the model 
presented here, disruption of psychological process is 
certainly not limited to the disruption of cognitive 
processes. 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
 
A generic psychological model of mental disorder 
proposes that biological, social, and circumstantial 
factors all operate causally by disrupting or disturbing 
psychological processes. This central conceptual point is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
Psychological approaches have always separated 
events from the interpretation of events. The model 
proposed here neatly separates events from the 
psychological processes that interpret, buffer, and act 
consequentially upon those events. Like the 
biopsychosocial model, the psychological model attempts 
to address the interactions between these classes of 
causal variables. Biological, social, and circumstantial 
factors are all important and all presumed to interact. 
Importantly, however, in this model it is the conjoint 
impact of these interacting factors on psychological 
processes that leads to mental disorder. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. The central role of psychological processes. 
 
This last, important point is worth elaborating. The 
model developed here implies not only that the common 
symptoms of psychiatric classifications are psychological 
in nature (i.e., that hallucinations, depression, anxiety, 
and so on are themselves psychological phenomena), but 
also that psychological processes—or rather disturbances 
or dysfunctions in psychological processes—are 
necessarily responsible for shaping the nature, extent, 
and type of the phenomena described collectively as 
mental disorder. Consequently, as in the biopsychosocial 
model, multiple causal factors are implicated. In a 
hypothetical case of depression, for example, several 
distal causal factors may be salient, and several key 
psychological processes may be implicated. It is possible 
to hypothesize that social deprivation, childhood 
maltreatment, genetic vulnerability, and biochemical 
insult may all contribute to the onset of depression. 
These factors may impinge on psychological 
processes such as those relating to self-esteem, beliefs in 
self-efficacy, and expectations of reward. They may 
implicate neuroanatomical systems responsible for 
reward and reinforcement, autobiographical memory, and 
social cognition, and may involve neuroanatomical 
systems that involve serotonin (as well as other 
neurotransmitters). Depression, in the model presented 
here, is characterized as a direct consequence neither of 
the neuroanatomical mechanisms nor of the contributing 
social and circumstantial factors. Rather, these 
neuroanatomical mechanisms and other factors are 
viewed as being important influences on the 
psychological mechanisms of reward and reinforcement, 
social cognition, and maintenance of self-esteem. And it 
is dysfunctions or disturbances of these psychological 
processes that are seen as ultimately leading to the 
mental disorder—in this case, depression. 
This argument can be applied to hallucinations. 
Abnormalities in the poorly lateralized speech areas of 
the brain (probably involving dopaminergic systems) and 
potential abnormalities in frontal functioning could, 
theoretically, lead to difficulties in source monitoring 
(detecting whether particular percepts are internal or 
external in origin). Social circumstances similar to those 
that are risk factors for other mental disorders may, in 
this model, interact with these biological variables in a 
number of complex ways, but most likely through the 
generation of negative intrusive thoughts. Once again, 
however, in the model presented here, the experience of 
hallucination is seen as a product of a psychological 
act—the misattribution of a percept’s origin. No one 
would deny that the distal causative factors could (at the 
very least, hypothetically) affect this source-monitoring 
process. In the model presented here, however, these 
distal causal factors do not “cause hallucinations.” 
Instead, they perturb the psychological processes, and it 
is these perturbations that lead to—that “cause”—the 
phenomena that are labeled mental disorder. 
As another illustration, the same type of analysis can 
be applied to personality disorder. Innate or heritable 
individual differences in personality traits (e.g., increased 
levels of the trait of neuroticism) may be exacerbated by 
life circumstances (e.g., experiencing childhood abuse) to 
precipitate more extreme personality dysfunction later in 
life. Under the model presented here, however, it would 
be inappropriate to say that the biological traits, the life 
circumstances, or even the combination of the two has 
produced or caused a personality disorder; instead, one 
would consider this combination of distal factors to have 
profoundly affected how the persons in question perceive 
themselves, their world, and their relationships with 
others. It is this element—the perturbation of 
psychological processes—that leads to mental ill health. 
 
 
 
 
 
WEAKNESSES AND POSSIBLE CRITICISMS 
OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL 
 
Philosophers of science consistently maintain that, 
even in supposedly objective science, the researcher’s 
interests and allegiances may shape claims of causality.79 
This insight is particularly pertinent in the case of mental 
health.80 If a person is “depressed” and has “low self-
esteem,” it is easy to see two professionals maintaining 
opposing points of view: one maintains that the 
depression caused the lowered self-esteem, whereas the 
other maintains that the depression results from negative 
self-evaluation. Many philosophers of science would 
conclude that in psychiatry, “truth” is dependent on 
perspective.81 
In the case of the model presented here, psychological 
processes are given center stage. It could be argued that 
this emphasis reflects nothing more than a perspective 
focused upon psychology, but even if that were true, it 
would not render the model invalid. Whether or not there 
were other perspectives, a coherent statement of the 
nature of psychological causation would remain entirely 
appropriate. But the model presented here makes a 
further, more specific, claim. It states that disruption of 
psychological processes is a necessary final element in 
the origin of mental disorder. This hypothesis is a 
testable one: if true, all mental disorder will be associated 
with disruption of mental processes, and such disruption 
will mediate the effects of biological factors on observed 
symptoms. And as Karl Popper79 suggested, such testable 
hypotheses separate subjectivity from science. 
 
“Truly Organic” Disorders 
 
While some readers may allow that a psychological 
model fits relatively well with disorders such as anxiety 
and depression, those same readers might nevertheless 
claim that there are “truly organic” disorders that do not 
fit at all. Disorders such as Down’s syndrome and 
phenylketonuria are unequivocally genetic in origin. In 
these cases, could it genuinely be argued that 
psychological factors are a final, necessary, common 
pathway? In addition to questions of causation, it could 
be argued that the interventions are social and medical 
rather than predominately psychological. Psychotherapy 
does not ameliorate the disorders, and medical care and, 
particularly, social care are both important. Moreover, in 
the case of phenylketonuria, the consequences of the 
undoubted genetic cause of the condition can be (largely) 
avoided by the social (or social and biological) 
manipulation of removing all foods containing 
phenylalanine. 
But let’s take a step back. A fundamental question is 
why Down’s syndrome and phenylketonuria are being 
considered at all in a discussion of mental disorder. The 
distinguishing feature of these two disorders—in relation 
to other genetic disorders—is their impact on mental 
processes. If phenylketonuria did not affect learning and 
behavior, it would still be a genetic disorder, but it would 
not be a mental disorder. By contrast, cystic fibrosis is a 
genetic disorder with a complex therapeutic imperative, 
but it is not a mental disorder. In cases of Down’s 
syndrome and phenylketonuria, care services must 
perform a proper formulation of the problem and address 
the observed functional elements. The most therapeutic 
intervention should be employed, but as can be inferred 
from an analysis of these two disorders, the identification 
of the best intervention does not necessarily impute 
causality. 
In view of the above, it should be apparent that the 
psychological model presented here does not preclude a 
causal role for genetic factors with respect to particular 
mental disorders. By the same token, the model does not 
assume that all mental disorders should be amenable to 
psychotherapy. What the psychological model does 
propose is that mental disorders are characterized by the 
disruption of psychological processes. Down’s syndrome 
and phenylketonuria occur because of genetic 
abnormalities. But it is clear that these genetic 
abnormalities, if not addressed through appropriate 
interventions, will disrupt psychological processes, 
especially learning and information processing. So, in the 
case of Down’s syndrome and phenylketonuria, 
biological factors are causal, and social interventions are 
the treatments of choice. Nevertheless, these 
interventions are necessary precisely because the organic 
consequences of the genetic abnormalities disrupt the 
patients’ psychological processes. 
 
Biology as a Final Common Pathway 
 
In an influential article, Eric Kandel82 reaffirmed the 
biological basis of psychiatry. He proposed a model of 
psychiatry that is, in essence, diametrically opposed to 
the model presented here. Kandel argued not only that 
organic or biological factors are important in most forms 
of mental disorder, but, more fundamentally, that 
alterations in biological functioning (as opposed to 
psychological functioning) are the final common 
pathway for mental disorder and, indeed, therapy. 
Kandel emphasizes (as does the model presented 
here) how biological factors can affect psychological 
functioning— emotions, cognitions, and behavior. But he 
also emphasizes the brain-based nature of psychology. 
He stresses how all emotions, all cognitions, and all 
behavior depend on brain functioning. Kandel points out 
that in a scientific sense, all learning involves structural 
changes in the brain—changes in synaptic responsivity at 
the very least, and possibly also ones involving 
neuroanatomy. He therefore logically deduces that any 
psychological causation of mental disorder must be 
ultimately organic in character, and that any therapy, 
even psychotherapy, must achieve its effect through 
biology. Not only does Kandel argue (as does the present 
model) that biological changes affect psychological 
processes, he argues that learned patterns of behavior or 
self-evaluative schemata learned in childhood reflect 
physical changes in the neural associative networks. He 
argues, moreover, that any relearning that occurs during 
therapy represents changes in those networks. 
On one level, this analysis is obviously true. Any 
learning must, at the molecular and synaptic level, be 
based on biological changes and involve the brain. But 
such an argument is intellectually trivial since all 
learning—all human behavior—is dependent on the 
functioning of the brain. An alternative approach might 
suggest that biological factors underpin all forms of 
associative learning—and therefore each particular 
learned association. To associate a caress with comfort 
and a sense of security is learned—learning that has a 
biological substantiation in the brain. Equally, perhaps, 
for someone who has survived abuse in childhood, a 
caress may be associated with fear, powerlessness, and 
self-loathing. Again, this associative learning will 
necessarily have a basis in biological substrates. But the 
difference between learning to associate a caress with 
fear, on the one hand, and contentment, on the other, 
cannot best be explained in terms of biological factors. 
Consequently, a reductive attempt at explanation will fail 
to account for the psychological phenomena in question. 
Other authors go even further than Kandel, arguing, 
in effect, that all psychological concepts will disappear 
from the psychiatric lexicon in the same way that 
phlogiston has disappeared from physics; that is, as we 
understand the neural basis of behavior, we will have no 
need for the notion of psychology.83 There are three main 
criticisms of such a position. First, the available data 
suggest that psychological factors (e.g., the presence or 
absence of certain dysfunctional beliefs) predict variance 
in the observed symptoms of mental disorder. It is 
important, intellectually and practically, to understand 
the links between these psychological variables and the 
biological substrate, but the variables’ predictive power 
indicates that, in any meaningful sense, they exist. 
Second, psychological variables implicated in mental 
disorder are no less dependent on neurological processes 
than are the psychological elements of normal life: 
competition, love, honor, guilt, and so on. It may be the 
case that fundamentalist neurological theories of mental 
disorder would wish to explain away these concepts as 
mental phlogiston, but few others share this ambition. 
Third, and most centrally, many commentators84−86 have 
addressed this issue by asserting that mental disorders are 
irreducibly human, rather than brain, phenomena. 
Reductive terms fail to capture the essence of human 
experience because it is more than the sum of its biologic 
parts. 
 
A Pluralistic Model 
 
In the face of coherent, though not therefore 
compelling, arguments in support of biological82 and even 
social23 models of mental disorder, it may be argued that 
we need to develop a pluralistic model of mental 
disorder—and not an exclusively psychological one. 
The impetus for the development of the psychological 
model presented here was a frustration with the 
biopsychosocial model. Most descriptions of that model 
fail to address the causal interrelatedness of the variables 
involved; biology, the social environment, life events, 
and psychological processes, while all important, are not 
independent factors. Consequently, a pluralistic model 
that regarded psychological factors as an independent 
class of causal agents, rather than as the final common 
pathway for the effects of other causal agents, would 
have the benefits of the biopsychosocial model but also 
all its flaws. 
Finally, of course, the model presented here is 
integrative. Biological and social factors are properly 
acknowledged; one might even hope that this model 
might itself be seen as pluralistic. That said, the model 
presented here does place central emphasis on 
psychology. Although that emphasis may prevent the 
model from being regarded as pluralistic at present, it 
may well be that a pluralistic model will eventually 
emerge from a concurrent reading of this model with 
others, such as that proposed by Kandel. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MODEL 
 
Models such as the present, psychological one are 
valid if they are useful. It has been powerfully 
argued84,87,88 that pragmatism should be the benchmark 
for evaluating theoretical models of mental disorder. In 
this context, the psychological model has obvious utility 
in guiding thought. It offers a conceptual framework that 
allows clinicians to separate and integrate multiple 
causes of mental disorder. Rather than proposing a 
simple “biological cause and psychological symptom” 
approach, the model separates causes both from 
mediating processes and from effects. The model has 
clear similarities to Padesky and Greenberger’s “five-
factor model,”89 which is widely used in cognitive-
therapy training. That model proposed five elements in 
mental disorder— affect, behavior, cognition, 
environment, and physiology. It contends that a full 
understanding of these five factors is vital for a complete 
formulation. The separation of affective, behavioral, and 
cognitive aspects of “psychology” within this model is 
especially important. The weakness of the five-factor 
model, however, is that it fails to specify the nature of the 
interrelationships between these factors. 
In the biopsychosocial model, although it is expected 
that all three elements contribute to the experience of 
mental disorder, it does not follow that psychological 
factors are central. The psychological model proposed 
here is different. Even if, as some biological psychiatrists 
might argue, biological factors account for the majority 
of the variance in the occurrence of a particular form of 
mental disorder—for instance, if one contends that 
neurodevelopmental abnormalities cause schizophrenia—
the psychological model would retain the disruption of 
psychological processes as a logically necessary final 
step. 
Conceptual issues notwithstanding, models are 
worthy of serious attention only if they serve practical 
functions. Indeed, one of the criticisms of the 
biopsychosocial model itself is that it fails to lead to 
practical answers. But the model presented here does 
have practical consequences, as we shall in the following 
sections. 
 
Research 
 
In addition to placing a high priority on research into 
psychological factors in mental disorder, the proposed 
model is helpful in pointing to the importance of 
studying the interrelationship of biological and 
psychological factors. For example, research might be 
conducted into the biological influences on source 
monitoring and simultaneously into the relationships 
between source monitoring and the experience of 
hallucinations. We might also investigate other 
(nonbiological) influences on source monitoring, and 
other psychological processes implicated in 
hallucinations and other phenomena of mental disorder. 
For instance, there is evidence that disruption of 
executive thought processes impinges on thought 
disorder, considered a psychotic phenomenon.90 
Paradoxically, the psychological model of mental 
disorder may actually help to explicate the mode of 
action of biological factors. For example, although 
abnormalities in serotonin metabolism are implicated in 
depression,62 the cognitive model of depression also 
seems to have some validity.35 Rather than focusing on 
which of these two models is correct (to the exclusion of 
the other), the psychological model of mental disorder 
points to the need to understand the relationship between 
biological and cognitive elements in depression (e.g., 
with cognition both as a dependent and independent 
variable in relation to the administration of selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors). Similar exercises can be 
imagined in many areas—for example, the relationship 
between dopaminergic systems and auditory source 
monitoring in the context of hallucinations, or the 
relationship between information-processing deficits and 
cognitive biases in the case of delusions. Rather than 
using science as a form of tournament in which 
biological and psychological explanatory frameworks are 
pitted against one another, the psychological model 
promotes synergy. 
Finally, there is the intriguing prospect of examining 
the model directly. The notion of a regression equation 
was introduced earlier. With some care it may be 
possible directly to examine the relative contributions of 
different classes of factors to the measured variance in 
observed phenomena of mental disorder. It would be too 
much to expect a full mathematical model of mental 
disorder—or of any one category of mental disorder. 
Nevertheless, there are clear, distinct predictions 
emanating from the different models outlined here, and 
they could be tested because the models make different 
predictions as to the relative contributions of, and the 
mathematical relationships between, different factors. 
The relative contributions of each factor within the model 
presented here could be tested to determine, for example, 
whether biological, social, or circumstantial variables 
contributed most to the variance in expressed mental 
disorder. It would be also possible to test whether 
psychological-process variables act (as is predicted) as 
complete mediators of the contribution of these variables, 
and this psychological model could be tested against 
plausible alternatives. 
 
Scientifically Testing Such a Model 
 
The validity of the proposed model rests on its ability 
to render coherent the available evidence concerning the 
role of psychological factors in mental disorder and also 
on its catalytic validity91 (which refers to the utility of the 
analysis in generating testable implications). As Figures 
1 and 2 reveal, the psychological model invokes the 
existence of a mediating variable and proposes, in 
particular, that all causes of mental disorder are mediated 
through their effects in disturbing or perturbing 
psychological processes. While Occam’s razor declares 
that a parsimonious (and therefore praiseworthy) 
scientific hypothesis does not unnecessarily multiply 
entities, the more complex structure proposed in Figure 
2, with its inclusion of a mediating variable (the 
perturbation or disruption of psychological processes) is 
logically necessary, empirically justified, and, indeed, 
testable. 
Theoretical models, in a scientific paradigm, are 
useful only if they are testable. One, possibly grandiose 
test would be to conduct an analysis of the statistical 
relationship between variables. If the model presented 
here is valid, more of the variance in mental disorder 
(assuming that such variance could be validly measured) 
could be accounted for through a pathway as described in 
Figure 2 than through one conforming to Figure 1 (or 
indeed any other combination of the variables). But such 
an analysis would, in practice, be difficult. The 
psychological model could be falsified if it was 
demonstrated that a putative cause (a biological variable, 
social circumstance, or life event) was associated with 
mental disorder without being associated with a 
disturbance or disruption of psychological processes. 
The psychological model also generates a variety of 
less grandiose hypotheses concerning the ways in which 
disruptions or dysfunctions of psychological processes 
affect mental disorder. In this category, investigations of 
the relationship between different forms of mental 
disorder and disruptions of the well-established 
psychological phenomena discussed above (e.g., self-
concept and source-monitoring) have already proved 
productive and could well be extended. The ways in 
which biological, social, or circumstantial factors affect 
psychological processes could also be investigated. 
The psychological model suggests a relatively simple 
research strategy for would-be researchers: for any 
particular mental disorder, one could examine the 
existing literature to identify a psychological process 
identified with that disorder. Then, any biological, social, 
or circumstantial factor also associated with that mental 
disorder would be ideal candidates for investigation. The 
psychological would predict links between those factors 
and the relevant psychological processes. Any revealed 
associations would increase our understanding of the 
disorder, and a failure to discover such links would 
undermine the model itself. 
 
Interventions 
 
The psychological model would imply a key role for 
psychological factors in therapy, and the model itself 
clarifies just what the role of the health care professional 
should be. In order to intervene to improve mental health, 
one of the predictor variables needs to be influenced. In 
this model, interventions will need to focus not only on 
the three classes of causal agents, but also on the 
mediating psychological processes. (One can imagine a 
box marked “intervention” in Figure 2, with arrows 
pointing to each of these four elements.) 
One might even see the roles of different members of 
the care team as addressing these different targets; for 
example, the role of a psychiatrist may be to prescribe 
medication to alter biological functioning (perhaps even 
to “correct” some presumed “underlying abnormality”). 
Within this model, however, the intervention would 
achieve its benefit via a positive impact on the mediating 
psychological processes. Interventions to improve the 
individual’s social and circumstantial environment 
(through the actions of many members of the care team, 
but principally, perhaps, social workers) would operate in 
much the same way. Specifically psychological 
interventions should, by contrast, directly target the 
psychological processes. 
For individual clinicians, the psychological model 
entails that cognitive and behavioral interventions should 
be routinely considered for all forms of mental disorder. 
It does not, of course, mean that any particular 
interventions would be obligatory—but only that they be 
considered. In the UK context (with a highly socialized, 
state-funded health and social care system), following the 
psychological model would entail considerable shifts in 
targets and funding. In other countries, the implications 
may be different. 
The psychological model’s structure—with its 
psychological processes and biological, social, and 
circumstantial factors—may also have utility in 
developing an integrated treatment plan. In the 
hypothetical cases outlined above, one can imagine a 
range of biomedical interventions—from the prescription 
of fluoxetine, through the application of 
electroconvulsive therapy, to novel and experimental 
approaches that could address possible organic causes. 
One might imagine social interventions of various kinds, 
including strategies focused on prevention, service 
provision, or even political action. In the case of 
circumstantial causes, the range of interventions is also 
broad—for example, appropriate counseling and service 
provision for people experiencing potentially 
traumatizing or health-threatening events, and preventive 
strategies for protecting children. It should be kept in 
mind, however, that all of the above interventions are 
different from, though complementary to, specifically 
psychological interventions, whose specific role is to 
address the disturbances or dysfunctions in psychological 
processes. 
Of course, in nearly all treatment settings, genuinely 
multidisciplinary teams operate successfully. How then 
does the model proposed here extend either routine good 
practice or the more principled application of the 
biopsychosocial model? Many critics of the 
biopsychosocial model have noted that, in practice (and 
as mentioned earlier), a presumed biological “primacy” 
holds sway with regard to both causality and treatment of 
mental disorders.31 Moreover, when “psychological” 
formulations or interventions are proposed, they often do 
not quite take the form proposed here. For example, 
although cognitive-behavioral methods and models are 
now widely advocated, that particular approach to 
treatment is based on a specific set of assumptions—
namely, that core dysfunctional beliefs and consequent 
negative thoughts play a key role in the development of 
mental disorder. The psychological model does, of 
course, incorporate such an approach, but the range of 
possible psychological processes whose disruption or 
dysfunction could lead to mental disorder is much 
broader in the psychological model than with cognitive-
behavioral formulations alone. This subtle shift to the 
incorporation of other psychological processes (for 
example, beyond orientations that are primarily or 
exclusively psychodynamic or cognitive-behavioral) may 
extend the range, subtlety, and power of psychologically 
informed, multidisciplinary care plans. 
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